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Abstract
Memory performance is usually impaired when participants have to encode information while performing a concurrent task.
Recent studies using recall tasks have found that emotional items are more resistant to such cognitive depletion effects
than non-emotional items. However, when recognition tasks are used, the same effect is more elusive as recent recognition
studies have obtained contradictory results. In two experiments, we provide evidence that negative emotional content can
reliably reduce the effects of cognitive depletion on recognition memory only if stimuli with high levels of emotional
intensity are used. In particular, we found that recognition performance for realistic pictures was impaired by a secondary 3-
back working memory task during encoding if stimuli were emotionally neutral or had moderate levels of negative
emotionality. In contrast, when negative pictures with high levels of emotional intensity were used, the detrimental effects
of the secondary task were significantly attenuated.
Citation: Buratto LG, Pottage CL, Brown C, Morrison CM, Schaefer A (2014) The Effects of a Distracting N-Back Task on Recognition Memory Are Reduced by
Negative Emotional Intensity. PLoS ONE 9(10): e110211. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211
Editor: Howard Nusbaum, The University of Chicago, United States of America
Received March 7, 2014; Accepted September 4, 2014; Published October 16, 2014
Copyright:  2014 Buratto et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: The authors confirm that all data underlying the findings are fully available without restriction. Data are available from ResearchGate using
the DOI 10.13140/2.1.4043.2004.
Funding: This study was supported by the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC, reference: BB/H001476/1, and BB/H001476/2).
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* Email: alexandre.schaefer@monash.edu
Introduction
A wealth of research has demonstrated that encoding informa-
tion in memory while depleting cognitive resources by a
concurrent task leads to a decrease in subsequent memory [1,2].
This cognitive depletion effect is usually found when contrasting
memory performance associated with two distinct encoding tasks:
a divided attention condition, during which a concurrent task has
to be performed while items are studied, and a full attention
condition, which does not involve a concurrent task. Studies using
recall tasks to measure memory performance have found that
memory costs due to divided attention are smaller for emotional
stimuli than for neutral stimuli [3,4]. These results suggest that
emotional content can moderate the effects of cognitive depletion
on recall. It is less clear, however, whether similar effects can also
be obtained in recognition tasks.
For instance, Clark-Foos and Marsh [5] showed that recogni-
tion accuracy was higher for negative words than for neutral words
under both full and divided attention conditions. These results
showed that the emotional enhancement of memory survived the
restriction of cognitive resources at encoding. However, these
authors have not found a significant interaction between encoding
task and stimulus emotionality, suggesting that emotional content
did not moderate cognitive depletion effects in their study. Other
studies combining a divided attention paradigm with recognition
tests for emotional stimuli also reported no interaction between
emotional content and encoding task (full vs. divided attention),
using both word and face stimuli [6,7].
By contrast, Kensinger and Corkin [8], although not explicitly
addressing this issue, reported descriptive statistics suggesting that
high-arousal words may have been less affected by cognitive
depletion than low-arousal words. Maddox and colleagues [9] also
recently reported an interaction between emotional content and
encoding task in a recognition task. These authors found that word
recognition performance was overall higher for negative compared
to both positive and neutral words, and that this effect was
stronger under divided attention. In addition, the figures reported
by Maddox et al. [9] suggest that negative stimuli were less
affected by divided attention than neutral or positive stimuli.
These contradictory results, and in particular the descriptive
statistics of Kensinger & Corkin (2004), could suggest that the
effects of cognitive depletion on recognition are moderated only by
stimuli with high levels of emotional intensity. However, this
hypothesis has to our knowledge never been formally tested.
It is thus still open to debate whether or not emotional stimuli
are more resilient against the deleterious effects of cognitive
depletion on recognition memory. Furthermore, two features of
these previous studies may have contributed to the conflicting
results. First, most of these studies have operationalized emotion as
a simple factor contrasting emotional vs. neutral items without
taking into account that emotional stimuli can be differentiated
according to their levels of emotional intensity (i.e., the perceived
strength of an emotional reaction to a stimulus). In other words,
these studies did not break down emotional stimuli into categories
of ‘‘high’’, ‘‘medium’’ or ‘‘low’’ intensity. Instead, all of these
categories are typically merged into a single ‘‘emotional’’ (or
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‘‘negative’ or ‘‘positive’’) category. Therefore, if a protective effect
against memory depletion is due to contents of higher emotional
intensity, as suggested by Kensinger & Corkin’s (2004) descriptive
statistics, then this effect might have been masked by the absence
of a differentiation between high and low intensity emotional
stimuli in most previous studies. This hypothesis would be
consistent with evidence that emotional content can have an
effect on memory that varies according to the levels of intensity of
the emotional stimuli employed [10,11].
The second possible reason for the discrepancies in previous
studies was the use of relatively short retention intervals (from
seconds to minutes). In recognition memory tasks, the effects of
emotion on recognition performance tend to be robust and stable
if long (at least several hours) study-test intervals are used [12–14].
These delayed effects of emotional content on recognition memory
are likely due to the long time-course of action of emotion-related
hormones and neurotransmitters [15]. Because most previous
studies investigating the effects of divided attention on the
recognition of emotional information did not use long retention
intervals, they may not have enabled a fair test of the long-term
impact of emotion on divided attention costs.
We report here two experiments that provide evidence that
negative emotional content can reliably reduce the effects of
cognitive depletion on recognition performance only if highly
intense emotional items are used. We used realistic emotionally
negative and neutral pictures clearly differentiated in three levels
of emotional intensity, defined here as the perceived emotional
strength of a given stimulus. In addition, we used longer retention
intervals than in previous recognition studies (4 hours in Exper-
iment 1 and 2 days in Experiment 2) to maximize the chances of
observing a reliable effect of emotional content on memory.
Cognitive depletion was implemented with a 3-Back vs. 0-Back
number working memory task while participants had to encode
emotional and neutral pictures (referred to hereafter as the
‘‘secondary task’’). This procedure is known to be very effective in
imposing high demands on cognitive resources [16–19]. In
addition, this procedure is ideal to examine the effects of cognitive
load on picture processing while maintaining constant viewing
conditions across divided and full attention conditions [20].
We hypothesized that, if high levels of emotional intensity have
a unique role in protecting recognition memory from the
deleterious effects of cognitive depletion, then only high-intensity
negative stimuli should remain unaffected by dividing attention at
encoding.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Forty adults (Mage =24.3, SD =3.5; 12 males)
took part in this experiment. Participants were paid £10 and
evenly assigned to each N-Back condition. Two participants (one
from each condition) with hit rate scores significantly deviating
from their group average (Z= +/22.5) were deemed as outliers
and excluded from the recognition data. All participants signed an
informed consent and the study was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the
University of Leeds.
Stimuli and Design. A total of 240 images (120 negative and
120 neutral) taken from IAPS [21] and Google Images were used.
All images were previously rated for valence and arousal using a 5-
point version (Valence: 1 = negative, 5 = positive; Arousal: 1 =
low, 5= high) of the Self-Assessment Manikin [SAM; 22]. These
ratings were obtained from a sample of 51 British students from
the University of Leeds (UK). Each picture was rated by a
minimum of 9 participants and a maximum of 21 participants
[23]. The stimuli used in both Experiments 1 and 2 were selected
from a larger pool of 961 pictures rated following the procedure
described above. The stimuli were split into two lists (A and B)
containing 120 images each. These lists were used as sets of Old
(studied) or New (unstudied) images in a counterbalanced manner
across participants. Within each list (A or B), 60 of the images were
negative and 60 were neutral. Similar to previous research [10,24],
we used the picture arousal scores to create different stimuli sets of
emotional intensity. The neutral pictures formed the low intensity
condition (Low) as they had a homogenous and low level of
arousal, consistent with previous research [10,24]. Next, the set of
negative pictures was further subdivided into two groups of 30
high-intensity (High) and 30 medium-intensity pictures (Medium)
by a median split on their arousal ratings. Picture groups differed
in valence [F(2,237) = 480.58, P,.001, g2p = .80] and arousal
ratings [F(2,237) = 346.93, P,.001, g2p = .75]. All pairwise
comparisons were significant (Ps ,.001). Mean valence and
arousal ratings are summarized in Table 1.
As in other studies [23,25], pictures obtained from ‘‘Google
Images’’ were added to ensure that negative and neutral pictures
were matched in relevant non-emotional dimensions (presence of
humans, human faces, animals and objects), and lists A and B were
also equated on these dimensions. In addition, low-level image
properties (brightness, contrast, and spatial frequency) were
matched across picture groups (High, Medium, Low), following
the approach used by Bradley et al. [26]. More specifically, picture
properties (brightness, contrast and spatial frequency) were
extracted for each picture using MATLAB. Brightness was defined
as the mean red, green and blue intensity for each pixel averaged
across all pixels in the picture. Contrast was obtained in two steps:
First, the standard deviation of pixel intensities in each image
column was computed; then the standard deviation across all
image columns was computed. The latter was used as an index of
contrast. Spatial frequency was obtained in three steps: First a
power spectrum of the image was computed; then the frequency
that split the area under the power spectrum in two equal halves
was obtained for each row and for each column of the image;
finally, these median-split frequencies were averaged across all
rows and columns. This average was used as an index of the
dominant spatial frequency in the picture. Negative and neutral
pictures did not differ significantly in any of these measures (all
Ps..12).
Stimuli in the secondary task were numbers ranging from 1 to
28. In the 0-Back task, participants were asked to press one of two
buttons if the number on display was a ‘‘5’’. In the 3-Back task,
participants were asked to press one of two buttons if the number
on display was the same as the number displayed three trials
earlier. Picture type was manipulated within subjects (High vs.
Medium vs. Low) and secondary task was manipulated between
subjects (0-Back vs. 3-Back).
Procedure. The experiment was divided into an encoding
stage and a retrieval stage, separated by an interval of 4 hours. At
encoding, participants viewed the pictures of one of the sets (A or
B, counterbalanced across subjects) displayed on a 170 screen,
using E-Prime. Emotional and neutral pictures were intermixed,
and presentation order was randomized. For every trial, a fixation
cross appeared for 500 ms, followed by an emotional or neutral
image, displayed for 2000 ms, followed by a black digit on a white
background, displayed for up to 5000 ms. Participants in the 0-
Back condition had to decide with a key-press whether or not the
digit on display was a ‘‘5’’ (0-Back condition) or whether or not the
number currently displayed matched the number displayed three
trials earlier (3-Back condition). The trial terminated after a key-
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press or after 5000 ms had elapsed. For both conditions,
participants were simply instructed to watch the pictures as they
were displayed on the screen. There were three blocks of 40 trials
with a brief rest period between each block, and two different lists
of digits were used and fully counterbalanced across participants.
Before the experiment, participants were given 0-Back and 3-Back
practice trials to get familiarized with the procedure.
Four hours after the start of the study phase, participants
performed a surprise recognition test in which they viewed all the
pictures (sets A and B) in a random order, with ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’
items intermixed. For every test trial, a fixation cross appeared for
2000 ms, followed by an emotional or neutral image displayed for
2000 ms. Next, a screen prompted participants to perform an old/
new discrimination using a keyboard press. The old/new prompt
was presented in the form of a 6-point confidence scale (from 1=
absolutely sure new to 6 = absolutely sure old). For each trial in
which participants responded ‘‘Old’’, a Remember–Know judge-
ment task was required [27,28]. Subjects were given the following
instructions: ‘‘You may recognize the picture very vividly and
remember specific details about its previous occurrence. In other
words, a remember response implies that you recall something
specific that happened when you first encountered this picture,
during the first session of this experiment. This may include
recalling what you thought when you first encountered this
picture, or anything else that happened when you first saw this
picture. When that is the case, choose the ‘‘Remember’’ option.
However, you may just have a feeling of knowing the picture,
when you cannot recall specific details about its first occurrence,
but simply know that you have seen it before. When that is the
case, choose the ‘‘Know’’ option’’. Subjects made the Remember–
Know judgments using keyboard presses.
Participant-level analyses. Memory data was analysed
using standard recognition measures (hit rates, false-alarm rates,
and Pr). Hit rate (HR) is the proportion of ‘‘old’’ responses
(options ‘‘4’’, ‘‘5’’, or ‘‘6’’ in the 6-point confidence scale) given to
studied (Old) pictures. False-alarm rate (FAR) is the proportion of
‘‘old’’ responses to unstudied (New) pictures. Pr is the difference
between hit rates and false-alarm rates (Pr = HR – FAR). Data
was analyzed with a mixed-design ANOVA (Analysis of Variance),
with Picture Type (High, Medium, Low) entered as a within-
subjects factor and Secondary Task (0-Back, 3-Back) entered as a
between-subjects factor. Given our research question, we hypoth-
esized that, if emotional intensity at encoding modulates the effects
of the secondary task on recognition memory, then we should
observe a Picture Type 6 Secondary Task interaction. Separate
HR and FAR were also analysed for ‘‘Remember’’ (R) and
‘‘Know’’ (K) responses. R responses can be interpreted as an
estimate of recollection processes at work during recognition,
whereas K responses can be taken as estimates of familiarity in the
absence of recollection [29,30]. In the analyses reported in this
study, we used corrected K responses (Kcor), which take into
account the number of R responses produced by the participant
and is given by Kcor = K/(1–R), where K is the proportion of K
responses (K-HR if the response is given to an Old picture, K-FAR
if given to a New picture) and R is the proportion of R responses
(R-HR if the response is given to an Old picture, R-FAR if given to
a New picture). We also analysed confidence judgements.
However, given that the results obtained on confidence judgments
did not significantly differ from the results obtained from the other
recognition parameters, we have included them in the supple-
mentary section (File S1) for the sake of conciseness.
Stimulus-level analyses. The analyses above allow to test
the main hypotheses following a classical approach. However, they
do not allow to directly contrast the size of the memory depletion
effect between different conditions of emotional intensity. Further,
they do not allow to control for low-level stimulus properties.
Recent research suggests that low-level physical properties of
pictorial stimuli may co-vary with picture emotionality [26].
Therefore, we also ran an ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance)
using each picture as the main unit of analysis. This analysis tested
the effects of Picture Type on the magnitude of the N-Back-driven
depletion of recognition memory, while controlling for low-level
picture properties (brightness, contrast and spatial frequency).
Here the effect of cognitive depletion was estimated for each
picture by a difference score between the mean Pr discrimination
score for this picture in the 0-Back and the 3-Back conditions. We
then computed a one-way ANCOVA testing the effects of Picture
Type with brightness, contrast and spatial frequency entered as
covariates.
Results
Recognition data: Hits, false alarms and Pr. A 3 (Picture
Type: High, Medium, Low)62 (Secondary Task: 0-Back, 3-Back)
mixed-design ANOVA on hit rates revealed main effects of Picture
Type [F(2,72) = 81.79, P,.001, g2p = .69] and Secondary Task
[F(1,36) = 16.15, P,.001, g2p = .31]. Pairwise contrasts yielded
significant differences between High and Medium intensity
pictures (MHR = .87,.72, SEs = .01,.02, respectively) and between
Medium and Low intensity pictures (MHR = .63, SE = .02; Ps ,
.001). Hit rates were also higher in the 0-Back compared to the 3-
Back condition (MHR = .80,.67, SEs = .02). Importantly, the
interaction was significant [F(2,72) = 5.93, P,.01, g2p = .14].
Planned contrasts revealed that the difference in HR between the
Table 1. Stimulus properties by Picture Type in Experiment 1.
Picture Type
High Medium Low
Property M SD M SD M SD
Valence 1.78 0.38 2.32 0.23 3.26 0.32
Arousal 3.60 0.39 2.76 0.29 2.11 0.40
Brightness 105.21 30.37 97.48 32.46 98.38 31.71
Contrast 13.62 6.16 15.44 7.08 13.28 6.80
Spatial freq. 16.85 10.39 18.29 11.48 19.83 11.74
Note. High = High emotional intensity; Medium = Medium emotional intensity; Low = Low emotional intensity (neutral).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.t001
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N-Back tasks was greater for Medium and Low intensity pictures
(ts.3.8, Ps #.001, Cohen’s ds. 1.24, large effect) than for High
intensity pictures (t=2.1, P= .04, d=0.68, medium effect). These
results indicate that the 3-Back task reduced correct recognition of
Medium and Low intensity pictures more than for High intensity
pictures.
For false-alarm data, only a main effect of Picture Type [F(2,72)
= 7.12, P,.01, g2p = .17] was found, driven by lower error rates
for High intensity pictures compared to Medium and Low
intensity pictures (MFAR = .10,.14,.14, SEs = .02, Ps ,.01).
Table 2 summarizes the results for hits and false alarms.
The results with Pr, which combines hits and false alarms into a
single measure, shows more clearly the differential impact of the 3-
Back task on memory across picture groups. A 3 (Picture Type)62
(Secondary Task) ANOVA on Pr revealed main effects of picture
type [F(2,72) = 83.10, P,.001, g2p = .70] and Secondary Task
[F(1,36) = 14.08, P,.001, g2p = .28]. Pairwise contrasts yielded
significant differences between High and Medium intensity
pictures (MPr = .77,.58, SEs = .03,.03, respectively) and between
Medium and Low intensity pictures (MPr = .49, SE = .03; Ps ,
.001). In addition, Pr was also higher in the 0-Back than in the 3-
Back condition (MPr = .70,.53, SEs = .03, P= .001). More
importantly, the Picture Type6 Secondary Task interaction was
significant [F(2,72) = 6.75, P= .002, g2p = .16]. Planned contrasts
revealed that the difference in Pr between N-Back tasks was
significant for Medium and Low intensity pictures (ts.3.91, Ps ,
.001, Cohen’s ds.1.26, large effect), but not for High intensity
pictures (t=1.63, P= .11, d=0.53, medium effect). The Pr data
thus show that cognitive depletion had a clear detrimental effect
on memory for neutral and negative pictures with moderate levels
of emotional intensity, whereas this effect was cancelled for
negative pictures with high levels of emotional intensity. Figure 1
illustrates these results.
Recognition data: Remember-Know judgments. Table 3
describes ‘‘Remember’’ and ‘‘Know’’ data. Correct and incorrect
R responses (R-HR and R-FAR, respectively) were analysed with
two 3 (Picture Type: High, Medium, Low)62 (Secondary Task: 0-
Back, 3-Back) mixed-design ANOVAs. The first ANOVA revealed
main effects of Picture Type [F(2,72) = 94.38, P,.001, g2p = .72]
and Secondary Task [F(1,36) = 16.19, P,.001, g2p = .31].
Pairwise contrasts showed that R hit rates were higher for High
(MR-HR = .70, SE = .03) than for Medium intensity pictures (MR-
HR = .50, SE = .03) and higher for Medium than for Low
intensity pictures (MR-HR = .37, SE = .03, Ps ,.001). R hit rates
were also higher in the 0-Back condition (MR-HR = .62, SE = .04)
than in the 3-Back condition (MR-HR = .42, SE = .04). The
Picture6Task interaction was marginally significant [F(2,72) =
2.70, P= .07, g2p = .07], tentatively suggesting that the increase in
cognitive load from the 0-Back to the 3-Back task reduced R hit
rates more strongly for Low than for High and Medium intensity
pictures. Because the trend was nearly significant and because we
had specific hypotheses concerning the effect of cognitive depletion
on memory, we further explored this interaction with separate
independent-sample t-tests for each picture type. The tests
revealed that the difference in R-HR between the N-Back tasks
was indeed greater for Low (t=4.97, P,.001, Cohen’s d=1.61)
than for High and Medium intensity pictures (ts ,2.94, Ps ,.01,
ds ,0.95). The ANOVA on incorrect ‘‘Remember’’ responses (R-
FAR) yielded no significant main effects or interactions (Fs ,2.5,
Ps..09).
Correct and incorrect K responses (K-HR and K-FAR,
respectively) were analysed in a similar manner. The proportions
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of ‘‘Know’’ responses were corrected to take into account the
number of ‘‘Remember’’ responses (Kcor). The ANOVA on Kcor-
HR revealed a main effect of Picture Type [F(2,72) = 5.30, P,
.01, g2p = .13] but no effect of Secondary Task (F,1, P= .87).
Pairwise comparisons showed that Kcor hit rates were higher for
High (MK-HR = .50, SE = .04) than for Low intensity pictures
(MK-HR = .44, SE = .04, P,.01) and Medium intensity pictures
(MK-HR = .14, SE = .03, P= .05). Kcor hit rates did not differ
between Medium and Low intensity pictures (P= .22). The
ANOVA on Kcor-HR also revealed a significant Picture6Task
interaction [F(2,72) = 6.51, P,.01, g2p = .15]. However, planned
contrasts between N-Back tasks for each picture type did not reveal
significant effects.
The ANOVA on Kcor-FAR revealed only a main effect of
Picture Type [F(2,72) = 5.31, P,.01, g2p = .13], with lower Kcor-
FAR for High (MK-FAR = .08, SE = .02) than for Medium (MK-
FAR = .12, SE = .02) and Low intensity pictures (MK-FAR = .12,
SE = .02, Ps #.01). There was no main effect of Secondary Task
and no interaction (Fs ,1.7, Ps..20).
Stimulus-level ANCOVA. Cognitive depletion was estimated
for each picture by a difference score (Pr0-Back – Pr3-Back). To
obtain this difference score, Pr values were first calculated for each
picture both in the 0-Back condition (Pr0-Back = HR0-Back –
FAR0-Back) and in the 3-Back condition (Pr3-Back = HR3-Back –
FAR3-Back). These Pr values were then subtracted from one
another (Pr0-Back – Pr3-Back), and this value was used as the
dependent variable. A large positive Pr difference score reflects a
strong the impact of cognitive depletion on memory. An
ANCOVA on this dependent variable with low-level picture
properties as covariates (brightness, contrast, and spatial frequen-
cy) was run using Picture Type as the independent variable (High,
Medium, Low). The advantage of this analysis is that it allows
direct comparisons between high and low emotional intensity
conditions while controlling for variations in individual picture
properties. The ANCOVA revealed a main effect of Picture Type,
F(2, 234) = 6.63, P,.01, g2p =05. Independent-sample t-tests
confirmed that the impairment in memory owing to the 3-Back
task was significantly smaller for High (MHigh = .09, SE = .03)
than for Low (MLow = .23, SE = .02) and Medium intensity
pictures (MMedium = .23, SE = .03, Ps ,.01), which did not differ
from each other (P= .99).
These results indicate that emotional intensity reduces the
impairment in recognition performance in the 3-Back compared
to the 0-back condition. In other words, stimuli with high levels of
emotional intensity were more resilient than less emotionally
intense stimuli against the memory decrement generated by the
secondary task.
Secondary task performance. Performance accuracy on
the secondary tasks is described in Table 4. A 3 (Picture Type:
High, Medium, Low) 62 (Secondary Task: 0-Back, 3-Back)
mixed-design ANOVA on task accuracy revealed main effects of
Picture Type [F(2,76) = 3.54, P= .03, g2p = .09] and Secondary
Task [F(1,38) = 30.67, P,.001, g2p = .45]. Pairwise contrasts
showed that accuracy was lower after the presentation of High
intensity pictures (Macc = .91, SE = .02) than after the presenta-
tion of Medium intensity pictures (Macc = .94, SE = .01, P= .03).
However, the High-Low contrast was not significant (Low:Macc =
.93, SE = .01, P= .09). Accuracy was also higher in the 0-Back
condition (M0-Back = .99, SE = .02) than in the 3-Back condition
(M3-Back = .86, SE = .02). The interaction was not significant (F,
1, P= .48).
The ANOVA conducted on response times (RTs) revealed a
main effect of Secondary Task [F(1,38) = 85.39, P,.001, g2p =
.69], reflecting longer RTs to 3-Back (MRT =1312 ms, SE =56)
than to 0-Back trials (MRT =584 ms, SE =56). There was also a
main effect of Picture Type [F(2,76) = 5.32, P,.01, g2p = .12] and
a Type6Task interaction [F(2,76) = 3.13, P= .049, g2p = .08].
This interaction was driven by a significant effect of Picture Type
only in the 3-Back condition [F(2,38) = 4.64, P= .02, g2p = .20],
with longer response times following High intensity pictures
compared to Medium and Low intensity pictures (MRT =1360,
1295, 1282 ms, SE =76, 66, 69, Ps ,.05). Response times
Figure 1. Recognition memory as a function of Picture Type and Secondary Task (Experiment 1). Memory performance was measured
with Pr, the difference between hit rates and false-alarm rates, which varies from 0 (no discrimination between studied and unstudied pictures) to 1
(perfect discrimination). Retention interval = 4 hours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.g001
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between Medium and Low intensity pictures did not differ
significantly.
Experiment 2
One of the key results of Experiment 1 is that negative pictures
with moderate intensity levels (the "medium" intensity stimuli)
provided little memory protection against cognitive depletion.
When cognitive load was increased at encoding, recognition of
medium- and low-intensity pictures decreased in a similar manner.
By contrast, recognition of high-intensity negative pictures was
barely affected. These results indicate that moderately negative
stimuli are not protected against working-memory-related disrup-
tion. It is possible, however, that the relatively short study-test
interval used in Experiment 1 (4 hours) was not long enough to
allow for a full development of the memory protection afforded by
moderately negative stimuli. This would be consistent with
evidence showing a positive relationship between study-test
interval and emotion-enhanced memory performance [31,32].
Therefore, Experiment 2 had two goals: First, we examined
whether the results of Experiment 2 could be replicated on a
different sample. Second, we examined if the lower memory
protection associated with medium-intensity pictures would also be
observed when the study-test delay was longer (2 days). If the
difference between high- and medium-intensity pictures in
Experiment 1 was caused by its relatively short study-test interval,
then increasing this interval in Experiment 2 should allow
medium-intensity pictures to achieve stronger levels of memory
protection when compared to low-intensity (neutral) pictures.
Method
Participants. Forty adults (Mage =19.7, SD =1.5; 7 males)
took part in this experiment. Participants were either paid £10 or
rewarded with course credits and were randomly assigned to one
of the N-Back conditions. Two participants from the 0-Back
condition were outliers (hit rates beyond 2.5 SDs from their group
average) and were excluded from the recognition data. All
participants signed an informed consent and the study was
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of
Psychology at Durham University.
Stimuli and Design. We used a total of 320 images (160
negative and 160 neutral) rated in a similar manner as the images
used in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, images were taken
from IAPS and ‘‘Google Images’’. They were split into two lists of
160 images (80 negative and 80 neutral). These lists were used as
Old or New stimuli and were counterbalanced across participants.
Negative pictures were further classified as high intensity (High)
and low intensity pictures (Medium) using a median split on their
arousal ratings. As in Experiment 1, neutral pictures formed a low-
intensity picture set (Low). The three picture groups (High,
Medium, Low) were significantly different in valence [F(2,317)
= 846.38, P,.001, g2p = .84] and arousal [F(2,317) = 711.57, P,
.001, g2p = .82]. As in Experiment 1, picture groups were matched
for content (similar number of pictures featuring humans, faces,
animals and objects) and for low-level visual features (similar
average levels of brightness, contrast, and spatial frequency across
groups; Ps..08). Picture properties are summarized in Table 5.
Procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1, except that the study-test interval was 2 days
instead of 4 hours.
Data analysis. Data analysis was the same as in Experiment
1.
Results
Recognition data: Hits, false alarms and Pr. A 3 (Picture
Type: High, Medium, Low)62 (Secondary Task: 0-Back, 3-Back)
mixed-design ANOVA on hit rates revealed main effects of Picture
Type [F(2,72) = 220.34, P,.001, g2p = .86] and Secondary Task
[F(1,36) = 29.23, P,.001, g2p = .45]. Pairwise comparisons
showed significant differences between High and Medium
intensity pictures (MHR = .82,.58, SEs = .02,.02, respectively)
and between Medium and Low pictures (MHR = .45, SE = .02; Ps
,.001). Hit rates were higher in the 0-Back than in the 3-back
condition (MHR = .70,.53, SEs = .02). More importantly, the
interaction was highly significant [F(2,72) = 10.62, P,.001, g2p
= .23]. Planned contrasts confirmed that the difference in HR
between 0- and 3-Back tasks was greater for Low and Medium
intensity pictures (ts.5.5, Ps,.001, ds.1.91, large effect) than for
High intensity pictures (t=2.3, P= .03, d=0.74, medium effect).
Table 4. Proportion of correct responses (Accuracy) and mean response times (ms) during the study phase in Experiment 1 as a
function of Secondary Tasks and Picture Type.
Accuracy Picture Type
Task High Medium Low
M SD M SD M SD
0-Back .98 .03 .99 .01 .99 .01
3-Back .84 .13 .87 .10 .86 .11
Response time Picture Type
Task High Medium Low
M SD M SD M SD
0-Back 590 181 584 180 578 157
3-Back 1360 340 1295 295 1282 310
Notes. 0-Back task: Participants pressed a button if the number ‘‘5’’ was displayed after each picture presentation. 3-Back task: Participants pressed a button if the
number displayed after each picture presentation was identical to the number displayed three trials before. High = High emotional intensity; Medium = Medium
emotional intensity; Low = Low emotional intensity (neutral).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.t004
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For false-alarm data, there was only a marginal effect of Picture
Type [F(2,72) = 2.52, p= .09, g2p = .07, driven by slightly higher
errors to High than to Medium and Low pictures (MFAR =
.18,.14,.15, SEs = .02). Table 6 summarises these results.
The results with Pr confirm the pattern described above. A 3
(Picture Type)62 (Secondary Task) ANOVA on Pr revealed main
effects of Type [F(2,72) = 153.55, P,.001, g2p = .81] and Task
[F(1,36) = 11.07, P= .002, g2p = .24]. Pairwise contrasts yielded
significant differences between High and Medium intensity
pictures (MPr = .64,.44, SEs = .03,.03, respectively) and between
Medium and Low intensity pictures (MPr = .31, SE = .02; Ps ,
.001). Pr was also higher in the 0-Back than in the 3-Back
condition (MPr = .53,.39, SEs = .03). Similar to Experiment 1, the
Type6Task interaction was significant [F(2,72) = 6.16, P= .002,
g2p = .15]. Planned contrasts revealed that the difference in Pr
between N-Back conditions was significant for Medium and Low
intensity pictures (ts.3.96, Ps ,.001, ds.1.28, large effect), but
not for High intensity pictures (t=1.23, p= .23, d=0.36, small
effect). These results fully replicate Experiment 1: Pr data in
Experiment 2 confirmed that cognitive depletion had a larger
detrimental effect on memory for neutral and negative pictures
with moderate levels of emotional intensity than for high-intensity
negative pictures. Figure 2 depicts these results.
Recognition data: Remember-Know judgments. Table 7
describes ‘‘Remember’’ and ‘‘Know’’ data. Correct and incorrect
R responses (R-HR and R-FAR, respectively) were analysed with
two 3 (Picture Type) 62 (Secondary Task) mixed-design
ANOVAs. The first ANOVA revealed main effects of Type
[F(2,72) = 71.73, P,.001, g2p = .67] and Task [F(1,36) = 5.96,
P= .02, g2p = .14]. Pairwise contrasts showed that R hit rates were
higher for High (MR-HR = .50, SE = .03) than for Medium
intensity pictures (MR-HR = .31, SE = .03) and higher for Medium
than for Low intensity pictures (MR-HR = .19, SE = .02, Ps,.001).
R hit rates were also higher in the 0-Back condition (MR-HR = .39,
SE = .03) than in the 3-Back condition (MR-HR = .28, SE = .03).
The Type6Task interaction was not significant [F,1, P= .56].
The ANOVA on incorrect ‘‘Remember’’ responses (R-FAR)
yielded a main effect of Picture Type [F(2,72) = 4.52, P= .01, g2p
= .11], reflecting a higher R-FAR for High (MR-FAR = .05, SE =
.01) than for Medium (MR-FAR = .03, SE = .01, P= .04) and Low
intensity pictures (MR-FAR = .02, SE = .01, P= .03). There was,
however, no effect of Secondary Task and no interaction (Fs ,1,
Ps..73).
The ANOVA on Kcor-HR revealed main effects of Picture
Type [F(2,72) = 62.41, P,.001, g2p = .63] and Secondary Task
[F(1,36) = 17.93, P,.001, g2p = .33]. Pairwise comparisons
showed that Kcor hit rates were higher for High (MK-HR = .64,
SE = .03) than for Medium intensity pictures (MK-HR = .41, SE =
.03, P,.001) and that Kcor hit rates were higher for Medium than
for Low intensity pictures (MK-HR = .36, SE = .02, P= .06). The
Type 6 Task interaction was not significant (F=1.64, P= .20].
The ANOVA on Kcor-FAR yielded no significant effect (Fs ,1.7,
Ps..17). These results indicate that the effects of protection against
cognitive depletion are not reflected in judgments of "remembering"
or "knowing". instead, they are observed in objective recognition
parameters (Hit rate and Pr).
Stimulus-level ANCOVA. The same ANCOVA used for
Experiment 1 was run on Experiment 2 data, leading to similar
results. Unsurprisingly, the ANCOVA revealed a main effect of
Picture Type, F(2, 314) = 5.06, P,.01, g2p =03. Post-hoc t-tests
confirmed that recognition performance for High intensity
pictures (MHigh = .06, SE = .03) was less disrupted by the 3-
Back task than performance for Low (MLow = .17, SE = .02) and
Medium intensity pictures (MMedium = .17, SE = .03, P,.01). No
difference was found between Medium and Low intensity pictures
(P= .83).
Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1. Negative
stimuli with high intensity levels were more protected against
cognitive depletion than neutral stimuli and negative stimuli with
moderate intensity levels. This pattern of results was found when
using both standard analyses (ANOVAs on Pr) and stimulus-level
analyses. In particular, we observed that the protective effects of
emotion against cognitive depletion remained different between
high- and medium-intensity pictures even after a 2-day retention
interval, suggesting that the relatively short interval in Experiment
1 was probably not the main factor behind this effect. This effect
was confirmed by cross-experiment analyses reported in the
supplementary section (File S1).
Secondary task performance. Performance on the second-
ary tasks is described in Table 8. A 3 (Picture Type:) 62
(Secondary Task) ANOVA on task accuracy revealed only a main
effect of Task [F(1,38) = 49.07, P,.001, g2p = .56]: accuracy was
also higher in the 0-Back condition (M0-Back = .99, SE = .01) than
in the 3-Back condition (M3-Back = .85, SE = .01). The main effect
of Picture Type and the interaction term were not significant (Fs,
1, Ps..39). As with accuracy, the ANOVA on mean response
times revealed only a main effect of Task [F(1,38) = 48.92, P,
Table 5. Stimulus properties by Picture Type in Experiment 2.
Picture Type
High Medium Low
Property M SD M SD M SD
Valence 1.57 0.33 2.25 0.26 3.21 0.30
Arousal 3.83 0.33 2.85 0.30 2.03 0.38
Brightness 108.89 30.67 98.22 33.78 100.95 30.77
Contrast 12.93 6.10 15.13 7.08 13.41 6.60
Spatial freq. 17.76 10.94 17.86 11.25 18.32 10.79
Note. High = High emotional intensity; Medium = Medium emotional intensity; Low = Low emotional intensity (neutral).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.t005
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.001, g2p = .56], reflecting longer RTs to 3-back (MRT = 1495 ms,
SE =93) than to 0-back trials (MRT =570 ms, SE =93). There
was no effect of Picture Type and no Picture type 6 Task
interaction (Fs ,1.13, Ps..32).
General Discussion
In two studies, we found that negative emotional content can
reduce and even cancel the impact of cognitive depletion on
recognition memory. Crucially, this study is the first to formally
demonstrate that this effect is specific to items with high levels of
emotional intensity, as emotional items with moderate or low
intensity levels were clearly affected by cognitive depletion. These
results are consistent with recall studies that have previously
demonstrated smaller divided-attention memory costs for emo-
tional information [3,4]; and they extend previous research
showing that this phenomenon can also be observed in recognition
tasks if highly intense emotional stimuli are used. These results
were replicated in two different samples, using different study-test
intervals (4 hours and 2 days). In addition, covariate analyses
established that our results cannot be explained by low-level
picture properties thought to correlate with picture emotionality
[26].
Our results contrast with previous research in which no
evidence of an emotional reduction of cognitive depletion effects
was apparent [5,6]. Two aspects of our experimental methods may
explain this discrepancy. First, we took into account varying levels
of intensity within our emotional stimuli. As explained in the
Introduction, there is ample evidence that high-intensity emotional
stimuli can have effects on memory that can be distinguished from
low-intensity emotional stimuli [10,11,24,33,34]. Previous studies
that used simple ‘‘emotional vs. neutral’’ contrasts may have
masked any protective effects from high-intensity emotional
contents, because these were merged with lower intensity stimuli.
Second, the study-test intervals used here were longer than those
in most previous studies. Longer intervals, from hours to days,
enhance the memory advantage of emotional stimuli in recogni-
tion tasks [13,14]. Adopting a methodological standard of longer
retention intervals may thus have helped to detect the protective
role of emotion against the effects of divided attention. However,
to fully investigate this possibility, future research will need to
contrast long retention intervals with conditions where memory
tests are performed immediately after encoding.
How does emotion protect memory against cognitive depletion
at encoding? A potential account involves the special attention-
grabbing properties of emotional stimuli. High-arousal negative
stimuli are known to mobilize attentional resources to a greater
extent than low-arousal stimuli [35–41], and overt attention plays
an important role in the emotional enhancement of memory
[4,23]. If more attentional resources remained available to high-
intensity compared to medium- and low-intensity stimuli while
participants performed the 3-Back task, then high-intensity stimuli
would benefit from better encoding and, consequently, better
recognition than medium- and low-intensity stimuli. In other
words, the additional attentional resources captured by high-
intensity stimuli would compensate for the attentional deficit
caused by the secondary 3-Back task. This account is consistent
with classical models of emotion-memory interactions [42–44] and
more recent accounts which emphasize the notion that attention
can mediate the emotional enhancement of memory [23,45].
These models suggest that, in the context of emotional memory,
emotional items might attract cognitive resources due to their
intrinsic motivational relevance [46], or because emotional items
are more distinctive when presented alongside neutral items [47],
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or because emotional items are more interrelated than neutral
items and therefore provide more opportunities for organizational
encoding strategies [48].
Consistent with this account, we found in Experiment 1 a
Picture Type6Secondary task interaction in response times. The
interaction was driven by longer response times to 3-Back trials
following high-intensity pictures. This finding may suggest that
high-intensity pictures took away attentional resources needed for
the secondary task, which therefore became more difficult.
However, this attentional account cannot explain all our results.
The same Picture Type6Secondary Task interaction in RT was
not significant in Experiment 2, nor was it significant when looking
at secondary task accuracy. In addition, models emphasizing that
emotional effects on memory are mediated by attention and other
related cognitive properties (distinctiveness and relatedness) are
thought to be mainly applicable when memory tests follow
immediately the encoding stage [49]. Emotional effects on
memory paradigms using longer study-test delays, such as the
current studies, may also be governed by neuromodulatory
mechanisms (as explained later in this discussion), which could
potentially mask the effects of attentional processes related to the
encoding stage. It has to be noted that, although the absence of
interaction in the N-back data of Experiment 2 suggests that overt
attention is not a reliable explanation for our findings, it does not
exclude a potential contribution of automatic forms of attention
that would not be affected by our 3-Back manipulation [9,23]
Alternatively, the vividness and fluency associated with the
encoding of high-intensity pictures could partially explain their
immunity against the effects of divided attention on memory.
High-arousal information is encoded more easily [50] and leads to
more vivid memories [51,52] than low-arousal stimuli. More
specifically, recognition of these stimuli is often associated with
higher levels of memory vividness, measured with ‘‘Remember’’
responses [10,33,53]. The results from Experiments 1 and 2
showed that high-intensity pictures yielded more correct ‘‘Re-
member’’ responses than medium- and low-intensity pictures,
suggesting that high-intensity pictures were encoded more vividly
than medium-intensity pictures. However, an account based
purely on vividness cannot fully explain our results, as the Picture
Type 6 Secondary Task interaction for correct ‘‘Remember’’
responses was only marginally significant in Experiment 1 and
non-significant in Experiment 2. More specifically, the difference
in ‘‘Remember’’ responses between high- and medium-intensity
pictures was not significantly stronger in the 3-Back condition
relative to the 0-Back condition, a result that would indicate a
relative sparing of the effects of divided attention on the vividness
of high-intensity pictures. Thus, the data are not consistent with
the view that vividness was the main factor contributing to
memory protection against cognitive depletion.
A more plausible explanation may be derived from theoretical
models of emotional memory which emphasize the modulatory
role that several emotion-related neurotransmitters and hormones
have on memory systems [15,54–56]. These models suggest that
neurotransmitters and hormones released during an emotional
situation can strengthen the formation and consolidation of
memory traces, making them particularly resistant to decay [57].
This mechanism is mediated by the amygdala, and it takes place
over a period of time that extends well after the encoding stage
[15]. These models are very useful to explain the effects of emotion
on recognition memory, because these effects are usually stronger
after a long study-test interval [31,32]. In addition, these models
are useful to explain parametric effects of emotional intensity on
memory (i.e., the effects of graded levels of emotional intensity on
memory [10,11,24]). Applied to the present study, it could be
speculated that cognitive interference disrupts encoding by
weakening the creation of a memory trace, making it more
vulnerable to temporal decay. However, the neuromodulation
triggered by arousing contents of high-intensity pictures could
potentially counteract the effects of temporal decay by strength-
ening the trace through long-term consolidation. The results
presented here are consistent with neuromodulatory models of
emotional memory effects in that (i) the effects were obtained after
a long study-test interval during which the consolidation processes
described in these models could have taken place; (ii) the effects
were dependent on a graded manipulation of emotional intensity,
in which only the highest level of emotional intensity provided a
Figure 2. Recognition memory as a function of Picture Type and Secondary Task (Experiment 2). Memory was measured with Pr (the
difference between hit rates and false-alarm rates). Retention interval = 2 days.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.g002
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protection against cognitive depletion. This is consistent with
evidence suggesting that high levels of emotional intensity are
linked to neuromodulatory mechanisms that are distinct from
moderate and low levels of emotional intensity [10,24,55,58].
The results reported in this article raise further questions that
need to be discussed. First, the concept of ‘‘emotional intensity’’
has significant overlaps with the concept of ‘‘arousal’’. Emotional
intensity is a concept that has often been used in the literature of
emotional processes and usually refers to the perceived strength of
an emotional reaction to a stimulus or a situation [52,59,60]. The
concept of arousal is often used in conjunction with emotional
pictures or words, and most of the time, refers to the self-reported
strength of an emotional state triggered by one of these stimuli
[60,61]. The concept of arousal is often used in contrast to the
concept of valence, which refers to a bipolar ‘‘positive vs. negative’’
dimension, and arousal is often seen as independent from valence.
However, when valence is unipolar as in the present study (neutral
vs. negative), valence and arousal tend to correlate and probably
refer to an underlying common unipolar perception of the strength
of emotional activation. To explore this question, we performed
multiple regression analyses that explored if the effects of unipolar
valence and arousal could be disentangled. Although the results of
Experiment 1 suggest that arousal has a unique moderating effect
on cognitive depletion, the same analyses were inconclusive for
Experiment 2 (see File S1), in which the effects of arousal and
valence could not be disentangled. This finding argues in favour of
the thesis that unipolar valence and arousal cannot be reliably
distinguished in this context, and that the findings reported here
are better accounted for by an underlying factor of negative
emotional intensity. Future research will be needed to establish if
the effects reported in this article can be accounted for by a
dimension of arousal that is independent from a bipolar dimension
of valence.
Second, as explained above, although emotional intensity was
the main driver of the effects reported above, it is important to
note that only neutral and negative stimuli, but not positive
stimuli, were used in this study. It is possible that positive stimuli
respond differently to cognitive depletion. In fact, neuroimaging
studies have shown that the valence of a subsequently-remem-
bered stimulus affects which neural systems are engaged at
encoding: negative stimuli preferentially recruit brain regions
associated with sensory processing, whereas positive stimuli
preferentially recruit regions linked to semantic processing
[62,63]. To the extent that negative and positive stimuli engage
distinct neural processes at encoding, they could also be differently
affected by a secondary task. However, data from attention and
memory studies indicate that arousing stimuli can behave in
similar ways regardless of valence [64]. For instance, arousal
equally improves memory for the spatial location of negative and
positive stimuli in both recall and recognition tasks [65].
Moreover, negative and positive stimuli with similar levels of
arousal are equally affected by cognitive depletion at encoding
[[66], Exp. 3]. These results show that, despite engaging different
neural processes at encoding, positive and negative stimuli may
behave in a similar manner in standard behavioural tasks. Further
research will be necessary to assess the impact of cognitive
depletion on memory as a function of bipolar valence. In
particular, these studies could address the putative encoding
differences between negative and positive stimuli with tasks that
tap more specifically sensory and semantic processes. For example,
cognitive depletion at encoding could have different mnemonic
consequences to negative and positive stimuli if the secondary tasks
require perceptual or semantic judgements. Likewise, potential
differences in valence could be uncovered at retrieval by
contrasting performance in yes-no recognition tasks, which tend
to engage more semantic, gist-based processes, and source
recognition tasks, which engage more perceptual, recollection-
based processes [67–69].
Third, it could be argued that we could have performed
mediation analyses similar to our previous work [23] to assess the
role of attention in the effects of emotion on memory performance.
Although this was not the goal of the studies presented in the
current paper, we acknowledge that it would have been an
interesting secondary question to address. However, mediation
analyses were not performed in this study for two reasons. First,
mediation analyses speak more directly to models which posit that
cognitive factors (in particular attentional factors) are sufficient to
account for immediate memory effects [23,45]. In our design,
however, retention intervals were long enough to allow neuro-
modulatory mechanisms to influence performance [15], above and
beyond potential effects of attentional changes at encoding. Thus,
mediation analyses here would be unlikely to provide a process-
Table 8. Proportion of correct responses (Accuracy) and mean response times (ms) during the study phase in Experiment 2 as a
function of Secondary Tasks and Picture Type.
Accuracy Picture Type
Task High Medium Low
M SD M SD M SD
0-Back .99 .01 .99 .01 .99 .02
3-Back .84 .11 .84 .10 .86 .10
Response time Picture Type
Task High Medium Low
M SD M SD M SD
0-Back 579 98 564 90 559 86
3-Back 1505 569 1473 583 1507 615
Notes. 0-Back task: Participants pressed a button if the number ‘‘5’’ was displayed after each picture presentation. 3-Back task: Participants pressed a button if the
number displayed after each picture presentation was identical to the number displayed three trials before. High = High emotional intensity; Medium = Medium
emotional intensity; Low = Low emotional intensity (neutral).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110211.t008
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pure test of attentional accounts of emotional memory effects. In
addition, the secondary task used in this study did not provide a
trial-by-trial measure of working memory that would be amenable
to mediation analyses. Although participants entered secondary
task responses on a trial-by-trial basis, the temporally extended
nature of the N-Back task (which relies on information stored N
trials earlier) clouds the interpretation of cognitive costs specific to
a single trial. This feature of N-Back tasks prevents the utilization
of mediation analyses to test attentional models of emotional
memory effects, because trial-specific cognitive costs are one of the
main units of analysis necessary for a mediation-based approach of
this question [23,45]. However, it is important to note that this
apparent limitation does not affect the main goal of the current
study, which was to examine if the effects of cognitive depletion on
memory were affected by emotional intensity. In addition, the
choice of N-Back as our secondary task was motivated by previous
research showing that the task can (i) reliably interfere with
emotional memory over long intervals [70]; (ii) impose significant
demands on cognitive resources [18]; (iii) provide a manipulation
of divided attention while controlling for viewing conditions [20].
Fourth, it could be argued that the 0-Back task could also recruit
cognitive control resources as it can be assimilated to a task-
switching context in which the encoding task alternates with the
digit task. Although this possibility cannot be fully excluded, the
behavioural results demonstrate that the 3-Back task imposed a
much heavier burden on cognitive resources than the 0-Back task.
Therefore, if any effects related to cognitive demands imposed by
the 0-back task occurred, they seem to have been significantly
outweighed by the demands imposed by the 3-back condition.
Finally, the secondary task used in the current studies differs from
most previous studies that typically involved requiring participants
to perform an actual attentional task at the same time of encoding.
In the 3-Back condition of the present studies, participants were
simply led to use working memory processes during encoding.
Therefore, one could argue that the depletion implemented in the
present studies relies on working memory processes, which could
explain the differences between our data and previous research.
We acknowledge this possibility, which could suggest that the
depletion-protective effect of emotion depends on the specific type
of depletion being implemented. However, it has to be said that
working memory and attention are often thought to be inherently
linked [71,72] and it is not excluded that working memory
processes may have been necessary to perform the distracting
attentional tasks used in previous studies [23].
In conclusion, we showed across two studies that recognition
memory for stimuli with high levels of negative emotional intensity
is protected against the effects of cognitive depletion at encoding.
Recognition memory was impaired when a secondary 3-Back
working-memory task was performed at encoding, but only when
the stimuli consisted of pictures with medium or low emotional
intensity. When pictures had high levels of emotional intensity,
cognitive depletion did not impair recognition memory. These
results extend previous research by showing that, under certain
conditions, encoding of emotional stimuli can become relatively
immune to cognitive depletion.
Supporting Information
File S1 Supplementary analyses. Further analyses were
carried out to explore the data on confidence ratings and to assess
the separate effects of valence, arousal, and study-test interval on
memory performance.
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